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THE DISRUPTOR’S DILEMMA: TIVO AND THE U.S. TELEVISION ECOSYSTEM 
ABSTRACT 
Firms introducing disruptive innovations into multisided ecosystems may confront the disruptor’s 
dilemma – they must gain the support of the very incumbents they disrupt. We examine how 
these firms may address this dilemma through a longitudinal study of TiVo, a company that 
pioneered the Digital Video Recorder. Our analysis reveals how TiVo navigated co-opetitive 
tensions by continually adjusting its strategy, its technology platform, and its relational 
positioning within the evolving U.S. television industry ecosystem. We theorize how (a) 
disruption may affect not just specific incumbents, but also the entire ecosystem, (b) co-opetition 
is not just dyadic, but also multilateral and intertemporal, and (c) strategy is both a deliberative 
and emergent process involving continual adjustments, as the disruptor attempts to balance co-
opetitive tensions over time. 
MANAGERIAL ABSTRACT 
New entrants confront a dilemma when they introduce a disruptive innovation into an existing 
business ecosystem, viz., how can they gain the support of the incumbents that their innovation 
disrupts? Confronting this “disruptor’s dilemma”, the disruptor must consider several issues: 
How might it pitch its innovation to attract end customers and yet reduce the threat of disruption 
perceived by ecosystem incumbents? How can the innovation be modified to fit into legacy 
systems while transforming them? Based on an in-depth analysis of TiVo and its entrepreneurial 
journey, we explore the strategies disruptors can deploy to address these issues.  


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There is considerable interest in studying disruptive innovations as posing threats to incumbent 
firms (Christensen, 1997; 2006; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). Most discussions around disruptive 
innovations focus on the challenges confronted by incumbent firms (e.g., Christensen, 2006; Danneels, 
2004; 2010; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) and how these might be addressed (Ansari and Krop, 2012; 
Christensen and Raynor 2003; Wessel and Christensen, 2012). 1 What is missing is a consideration of the 
challenges that disruptors, often start-up firms, confront in establishing their innovations as the basis for 
firm survival and growth (Yu and Chang, 2010). This lack of focus is surprising given low survival rates 
for entrants (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2011; Stubbart and Knight, 2006). 
We address this gap by drawing on several related literatures. The literature on industry ecosystems 
emphasizes not just firms operating in isolation, but also an ecology of interdependent firms (Adner, 
2012; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Moore, 1996; Wareham, Fox and Giner, 2014). An appreciation of 
ecosystem dynamics draws attention to the need for disruptors to stitch together their own value networks 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Teece, 1986) to establish their disruptive innovations. These value 
networks may also include ecosystem incumbents with potentially conflicting interests, especially in 
multisided markets (Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2003).  
The juxtaposition of the literatures on disruptive innovation and multisided industry ecosystems 
reveals a paradox. Specifically, to survive and grow, firms that introduce innovations that disrupt existing 
ecosystem dynamics (henceforth disruptors) may need the support of the very incumbents whose 
technologies, products or business models they disrupt. In other words, to graft its innovation into an 
existing ecosystem, the disruptor needs cooperation from the incumbents who, threatened by the 
innovation, may resist and even retaliate (Markman and Waldron, 2014). The presence of such 

1Disruptive innovations are new technologies, products or business models that are financially unattractive to 
incumbents (Christensen, 2006; Markides, 2006). They can be (a) “low-end” innovations that target customers 
“overserved” by the functionality of their current provider, such as discount department stores (e.g., Walmart), (b) 
“new-market” innovations that target “non-served” customers, i.e., those unable to access, use or even afford the 
product, such as online auctions (e.g., eBay), or (c) hybrids, that combine both overserved and non-consumers, such 
as low-cost airlines (e.g., Southwest Airlines) (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Christensen et al., 2004). While much 
of this work focuses on how disruption affects incumbents, disruptions that are systemic in nature may also 
jeopardize the existing linkages among the different members of an ecosystem.  

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simultaneous forces for cooperation and competition represents co-opetition (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Ketchen, Snow and Hoover, 2004).  
When taken together, these literatures highlight a key question: What are the challenges that an 
entrant, especially a start-up firm, confronts in introducing a disruptive innovation into an ecosystem, 
and how does it address them? We address this question by conducting a longitudinal study of TiVo, a 
start-up firm that pioneered the Digital Video Recorder (DVR) within the U.S. television (TV) industry 
ecosystem. TiVo’s DVR technology stood to fundamentally transform TV viewing and the relationships 
among members of the TV industry ecosystem. The DVR enabled asynchronous à la carte viewing of 
television programs that changed the network-centric program schedule to a demand-driven one (Gartner, 
2005). Moreover, the DVR enabled the fast-forwarding of commercials by viewers, rendering ineffective 
the existing practice of placing (and charging premium prices for) commercials during primetime or 
popular programs.  
Our analysis of the longitudinal data on TiVo and the TV industry ecosystem generated three 
themes that we develop in this paper. First, a disruptor confronts three co-opetitive tensions 2 – 
intertemporal, dyadic, and multilateral. Second, the disruptor continually adjusts its strategy to address 
these co-opetitive tensions as they arise. Third, as the disruptor’s innovation and relational positioning 
within the changing ecosystem co-evolve, the disruptor has greater latitude to frame its innovation as 
being sustaining to the operations of ecosystem members. Overall, these themes contribute to an 
understanding of strategy as an emergent process (Burgelman, 1988; Mintzberg, 1978).  
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION: THE DISRUPTOR’S DILEMMA 
A steady stream of work has been published on disruptive innovations (e.g., Chandy and Tellis, 
2000; Christensen, 1997; 2006; Danneels, 2004; Markides, 2006; Shanklin and Ryans, 1987) wherein a 
new technology, product, or business model adversely impacts the financial model of an incumbent 
(Christensen, 2006). Most studies are from the perspective of the firms that are “disrupted,” i.e., 

ʹ ǡ             
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established or incumbent firms that either lose ground and perish (e.g., Anderson and Tushman, 1990; 
Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; Danneels, 2010; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tripsas and Gavetti, 
2000) or survive and prosper (Chandy and Tellis, 2000; Leifer et al., 2000; Richman and Macher, 2004; 
Tripsas, 1997). But, there are fewer studies that examine the challenges that disruptors encounter in their 
efforts to introduce and promote their innovation within an existing ecosystem (Ansari and Krop, 2012).  
Industry ecosystems are business networks of interconnected firms that depend on one another for 
their mutual effectiveness and survival (Adner, 2012, Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Kapoor and Lee, 2013; 
Moore, 1996). Constituting an industry’s ecosystem are producers (including suppliers, competitors, and 
complementors) from the supply side, distribution channels and consumers from the demand side, and 
regulators and other interested stakeholders from the institutional side (Adner and Zemsky, 2006; Garud 
and Karnoe, 2001). Each firm’s value network, encompassing its respective suppliers, complementors, 
rivals and customers, overlap and become intertwined to generate multiple value propositions that may be 
complementary or substitutive (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996).3 Such situations are especially likely 
in systemic industries (Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy, 2002; Katz and Shapiro, 1985) forged around 
multisided platforms (Boudreau, 2012; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; Rochet and Tirole, 2003)4. 
Disruptive innovations disturb the business models of ecosystem incumbents who are likely to 
resist and counter-mobilize (Garud et al., 2002; Glasmeier, 1991; Markman and Waldron, 2014). For 
instance, Sun Microsystems confronted resistance and then counter-mobilization from Microsoft – a 
dominant incumbent in the computer industry ecosystem – when it attempted to disrupt Microsoft’s 
Windows franchise and gain platform leadership for its Java software technology (Garud et al., 2002). In 
the browser space, Netscape faced strong counter-mobilization when it openly confronted Microsoft, 
which it labeled the “Death Star” while casting itself as the rebel alliance that would “liberate the galaxy” 
by making Microsoft obsolete (Cusumano and Yoffie, 1998; Yoffie and Kwak, 2002).  

͵Brandenburger for clarifying this point.
ͶMultisided platforms connect multiple groups or sides that seek access or links to one another. For instance, eBay 
and PayPal link consumers with merchants; Google’s search engine connects advertisers and users. Other platforms, 
such as Microsoft’s Windows, have several sides (application developers, users, and OEMs), as does the Blu-ray 
standard for DVDs (content providers, manufacturers of DVD players, and consumers) (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2009).

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To add to the challenges, a firm that offers a disruptive innovation must gain access to 
complementary assets (Teece, 1986) lest its innovation remain confined to niche markets. Therefore, a 
disruptor introducing its innovation into an existing ecosystem needs to stitch together a set of 
transactions, rules and roles governing the arrangements, relationships and interdependencies, especially 
with established incumbents (Adner, 2012; Glasmeier, 1991; Jacobides, Knudsen and Augier, 2006;
Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). While this is difficult enough, the challenge is exacerbated in ecosystems 
built around multisided platforms, where disruptors have to contend with the conflicting interests and 
demands of different sides. For example, even Sony, a company with deep pockets, failed to consider the 
challenges its disruptive innovation posed for the other sides (i.e., authors and publishers) of the 
publishing industry ecosystem when it introduced the Reader for e-books in 2006 (Adner, 2012). 
Publishers did not sign on and, consequently, nor did readers.  
These issues lead us to a central dilemma that disruptors confront. Disruptors risk retaliation from 
incumbent firms potentially disrupted by the innovation, but yet may need the support of these very 
incumbents to establish their innovation within the existing ecosystem. Underlying this disruptor’s 
dilemma are conflicting pressures on disruptors to both cooperate and compete with other firms. This 
speaks to the notion of co-opetition (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996), 
which is the “sum of many different relationships and the cooperative and competitive parts are divided 
between different actors” (Gnyawali and Park, 2011:651). A narrower view, one that Gyanwali and Park 
specifically explored, pertains to dyadic co-opetition, i.e., the “simultaneous collaboration and 
competition between two firms and [how] the different parts of the relationship are divided between 
activities.” The task of managing such co-opetitive relationships is all the more challenging in systemic 
industries with multisided platforms and complex ecosystems. 
Given all these challenges, evidence suggests that new entrants have low survival rates (O’Reilly 
and Tushman, 2011; Stubbart and Knight, 2006). These challenges are further exacerbated for start-ups 
(Markman and Waldron, 2014) because they are disadvantaged by a paucity of resources. While large 

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new entrants and incumbents may be able to endure challenges (such as the disruptor’s dilemma) to gain 
market share over time, the innovations of start-ups may remain confined to niche markets; at an extreme, 
the firm may not even survive (Chen, 1996). These observations motivate our inquiry into how a new 
entrant, especially a start-up firm, can deal with the challenges of introducing its disruptive innovation 
into an existing industry ecosystem.  
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODS 
We chose TiVo and the U.S. TV industry ecosystem to conduct our exploratory study for a number 
of reasons. First, the process that unfolded as TiVo introduced its disruptive innovation (the DVR) 
represents a “revelatory case” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Second, the TV industry ecosystem 
comprises multiple sides such as broadcast networks and content providers, advertisers, content 
distributors, hardware manufacturers, audience measurement and ratings firms, regulators, and television 
viewers. Each side has different interests and motivations vis-à-vis TiVo and its DVR technology. The 
industry itself has systemic characteristics (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) and exhibits the complex 
interdependencies associated with multisided platforms (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). All these make the TV 
industry ecosystem a “strategic research site” (Merton, 1987) for the purpose of this study. 
Sources of data 
Table 1 summarizes our data and sources. We began by gathering extensive longitudinal data on 
TiVo and the U.S. TV industry ecosystem through keyword searchers of publicly available archival 
sources between the years 1995 (two years before TiVo’s precursor firm was founded) and 2012. We also 
gained access to scholarly articles and business cases on the U.S. TV industry ecosystem and TiVo. These 
publications dealt with the initial relationships among key incumbents of the U.S. TV industry ecosystem, 
the unfolding of DVR technology, the respective positions of TiVo and industry incumbents, and the 
changing behaviors of television viewers as the DVR was introduced. Besides, we downloaded all the US 
patents awarded to TiVo, and gained access to TiVo’s SEC filings and company news releases over the 
years till 2012. Finally, to ascertain the perspectives of the industry regulator and diverse industry 


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participants on DVRs in general and TiVo in particular, we downloaded documents published by the 
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) and key industry associations.  
-- Table 1 here -- 
 In addition to archival sources, following Danneels (2010), Joseph and Ocasio (2012), Capaldo 
(2007) and others, we interviewed seven current and former senior executives of TiVo (including a 
company founder, the CEO, and the CFO) either telephonically or in person during visits to TiVo’s 
headquarters. All these executives had been intimately involved in key facets of TiVo (such as strategy 
formulation, technology development and forging of ties with members of the TV industry ecosystem) 
during various stages of its growth. We started our open-ended interviews (ranging from 45 minutes to 90 
minutes each) by requesting informants to describe TiVo’s strategy, its evolving relationships with other 
members of the ecosystem, and changes to its technology platform over time. In addition, we gained 
access to audio-video files or transcripts of 24 interviews of TiVo executives conducted between 2002 
and 2012 by others. Including the 7 interviews that we conducted, we had access to a total of 31 
interviews. These interviews confirmed what our archival data highlighted and, in addition, enabled us to 
gain a more nuanced insider’s view of how TiVo’s executives attempted to deal with emergent challenges.  
There are advantages of using diverse longitudinal data from multiple sources. First, as Burgelman 
(2011:594) noted, “historical methods are inherently concerned with longitudinal development, and 
involve reconstructing the unfolding of individual and collective action patterns leading up to relatively 
unique events.” Second, triangulation across these data (Jick, 1979) generated a rich understanding of the 
dynamics that unfolded, and led to the identification of key themes based on rigorous analysis.  
Data analysis
This corpus of data allowed us to create a robust chronology of events pertaining to TiVo and the 
U.S. TV industry ecosystem since 1995. Our approach was to triangulate upon critical events within a 
larger chronology of events to gain an understanding of the underlying dynamics. As suggested by Van de 
Ven and Poole (1990), we identified key actors in the ecosystem (e.g., TiVo, content providers, content 

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distributors, hardware manufacturers, ratings & measurement firms, viewers, regulators and industry 
associations), associated contextual factors, and the outcomes or effects (e.g., positive or adding value vs. 
negative or disruptive) on TiVo and others.  
To conduct a more fine-grained analysis, we constantly compared data from various sources with 
our emerging theoretical insights (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). We used NVivo 10 to identify key sub-
themes and themes in our data (Table 2 is an abridged examples of our larger thematic analysis). This 
thematic analysis was conducted in conjunction with the generation of a 24-page case narrative of the 
events that had transpired in the U.S. TV industry ecosystem since TiVo’s entry. One TiVo executive 
read this case narrative and verified that the details and our interpretations of events were accurate. This 
step represents a member check (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) to confirm the accuracy and adequacy of our 
data and interpretations. In the next section, we present the findings of our analysis using an abbreviated 
version of our narrative to offer readers an overall context.  
-- Table 2 here -- 
NAVIGATING THE DISRUPTOR’S DILEMMA 
The origins of the disruption from DVRs (also called personal video recorders or PVRs) can be 
traced to 1999 when TiVo first introduced its DVR box and service. TiVo’s DVR box contained a hard 
drive that made it possible for subscribers to record television programs in digital form. Its services 
included an up-to-date electronic program-guide, the possibility to record and watch programs at viewer’s 
convenience, and an ability to fast-forward through commercials for a more seamless TV viewing 
experience. In addition, the digital technology offered the potential to transform television viewing into an 
interactive experience through two-way connectivity (initially through a phone line).  
Prior to TiVo’s introduction of its DVR, the traditional television-broadcasting model rested on 
“the logic of linear flow,” with strategic program schedules designed by broadcast and cable networks to 
channel viewers’ attention and generate advertising revenues during prime-time viewing. Consistent with 
this broadcasting model, the TV industry ecosystem during the late 1990s comprised multiple entrenched 

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and interdependent sides or groups. Television viewers, who valued access to interesting 
programs/content, constituted one side. Content providers – cable networks (e.g., Disney, ESPN, 
Discovery), broadcast networks (NBC, CBS, ABC and Fox) and movie studios (e.g., Universal, Sony) – 
constituted another side. Content distributors – cable and broadband providers (e.g., Comcast, AT&T, 
Cox) and satellite providers (e.g., DirecTV, Dish Network) – collated programming to offer various 
packages of content that viewers could subscribe to. To do so, they relied on technologies and products 
supplied by hardware manufacturers (e.g., set-top box manufacturers such as Scientific Atlanta and 
Motorola, and consumer electronics firms such as Sony and Philips). Advertisers who attempted to reach 
television viewers by purchasing commercial spots on popular channels and programs constituted yet 
another important side.  
Not surprisingly, audience measurement and ratings firms (such as Nielsen) were also important. 
They kept track of the programs that were popular with television viewers so that interested players such 
as content providers, content distributors and advertisers could fine-tune their respective offerings. 
Finally, overseeing all members of the industry ecosystem was the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), the regulatory body that maintained appropriate security and decency standards, and also ensured 
that few powerful firms did not control either content or distribution. Though the different sides had 
negotiated revenue/profit-sharing arrangements among themselves, relationships between various sides 
were inherently conflict-ridden over who controlled access to television viewers and how value from such 
access was appropriated.  
In introducing its DVR, TiVo’s strategy was to create a platform that would result in a significant 
departure from the traditional television-broadcasting model and the negotiated relationships and 
agreements that this model implied. As noted in TiVo’s final IPO prospectus (1999:3): 
“The TiVo Service allows viewers to watch what they want when they want and creates a 
richer and more enjoyable television viewing experience by offering viewers greater 
control, choice, and convenience. The TiVo Service also serves as a new platform for 
programmers, advertisers and network operators to deliver new types of advertising and in-
home commerce.” 
 

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Clearly, the introduction of TiVo’s DVR, which enabled recording and time-shifting of programs 
and fast-forwarding of commercials, would disrupt many ecosystem incumbents. For content providers, 
time-shifting of programs and fast-forwarding of commercials would make it difficult to generate 
lucrative revenue streams by selling commercial spots during prime time or popular programs. 
Advertisers and marketers also would need to rethink the value of the prime time “30 second spot” (Buell, 
2001) and find new ways of reaching viewers who fast-forwarded through commercials. Audience 
measurement firms such as Nielsen would be adversely impacted too, as monitoring/measuring viewers’ 
preferences and behaviors would become more difficult. Equally importantly, the DVR had the potential 
to compromise the hitherto direct access to viewers that content distributors (i.e., cable and satellite 
providers) enjoyed through their distribution platforms. Finally, TiVo’s DVR could replace proprietary 
cable or satellite set-top boxes, thereby hurting the manufacturers of these devices. In other words, TiVo 
and its DVR stood to disrupt the existing relationships between TV industry incumbents and, thereby, 
their business models and value propositions based on the traditional broadcasting model. 
Our analysis of TiVo’s attempts to enter and establish its innovation as a platform within the TV 
industry ecosystem reveals three themes. First, TiVo confronted three co-opetitive tensions because it was 
perceived as a disruptive force by the existing industry ecosystem. Second, TiVo had to make continual 
adjustments over time to address these emergent co-opetitive tensions. Third, TiVo’s DVR platform and 
its relational positioning within the ecosystem evolved over time due to these continual adjustments.  
Theme 1: Co-opetitive tensions and challenges in disrupting existing ecosystem 
Our first theme underlines the disruptor’s dilemma, i.e., the tensions and challenges disruptors 
confront in seeking the support of the very firms they disrupt. An analysis of the data revealed three co-
opetitive tensions – intertemporal (i.e., short term vs. long term), dyadic (i.e., within dyadic relationships), 
and multilateral (i.e., across relationships spanning multiple dyads or multiple ecosystem sides).  
Intertemporal co-opetition. From the beginning, TiVo tried to gain buy-in from ecosystem 
incumbents by offering a vision of future benefits from its DVR platform. For instance, TiVo’s services 



11
would generate fine-grained and real-time understanding of viewer preferences and behaviors. TiVo also 
would offer new interactive ways for advertisers and content providers to reach viewers, thereby 
transforming the passive consumer experience of viewing commercials on TV into an interactive 
experience tailored to specific consumer needs. A TiVo executive we interviewed described the 
company’s strategy as “build it and they will come.”  
Despite the possibilities of reaping these benefits in the future, incumbents felt the disruptive 
effects of TiVo’s innovation immediately. As one TiVo founder informed us: “Our DVR was especially 
disruptive to the networks (i.e., content providers) and advertisers.” It was therefore not surprising that 
reactions to the DVR were negative: “[D]VR is fast becoming a four-letter word in some advertising and 
media circles” (Forkan, 2000: 18). This strong negative reaction is exemplified by TiVo co-founder Mike 
Ramsey’s recollection during an interview: 
“And, when they [ecosystem incumbents] saw this thing [TiVo’s DVR], they’d just go 
completely nuts… (and show) every emotion [such as]…anger, hate…And not only did 
they have a negative reaction and throw us out of their office…but they talked to the 
press…and would tell them that we were evil and that, if this took off, it was going to 
have a massive negative impact on the US economy, and all sorts of doomsday kind of 
statements.” (iinovate.blogspot.com, 2006)  
 
Not surprisingly, industry analysts and the popular media too portrayed the DVR as a disruptive 
technology. For instance, the headline of the lead article in the New York Times Magazine (Lewis, 2000) 
proclaimed: “The End of the Mass Market” and discussed “how new television technology could destroy 
advertising as we know it.” In February 2000, Forrester Research analyst Josh Bernoff’s report on DVRs 
was titled: “The End of TV (As We Know It).” Analysts also noted how TiVo had the “potential to 
change how people watch[ed] TV” (Greenberg, 2000) and how television viewers rapidly were becoming 
“used to the idea that they never have to watch a commercial again” (Walker, 1999).  
Such media rhetoric, in turn, heightened the disruptive threat perceived by ecosystem incumbents, 
thereby making it even more difficult for TiVo to gain acceptance for its innovation. A former member of 
the executive team recalled the initial response from media companies: “When I first approached the CEO 
of a key media company, the first thing he said to me was: This is a cancer on my business, so what is it 



12
that you really wanted to talk about?” Barry Diller, USA Networks chairman, reportedly asked TiVo 
executives who sought his support: “Let me see if I understand this. All the other companies are investing 
in you so they can preside over their own demise?” (quoted in Chen, 2001).  
The potential for future benefits for ecosystem members along with perceptions of immediate 
disruption generated forces for both cooperation and competition between TiVo and incumbents that we 
label as intertemporal co-opetition. We define intertemporal co-opetition as a situation in which a 
newcomer’s innovation can offer ecosystem members benefits that might materialize only in the future 
whereas the innovation’s disruptive effects are felt immediately. Particularly threatening to incumbents is 
the uncertainty over how the disruptor’s innovation will redistribute revenues and profits among 
ecosystem members. Consequently, it is likely that the newcomer will not gain support for its innovation.  
Dyadic co-opetition. Realizing well the incumbents’ adverse reactions, TiVo attempted to 
minimize the perceived threat of its DVR. For instance, TiVo offered a conciliatory gesture to the 
industry by choosing not to offer a commercial skip button (whereas its competitor Replay TV did), and 
instead offered its subscribers the option to fast-forward commercials. TiVo’s co-founder informed us: 
“Because of this, we were perceived by the industry as the relatively good guys among the disruptors.” 
In addition, TiVo hired an executive familiar with the media industry to reach out to ecosystem 
incumbents and emphasize the potential benefits of its DVR. This executive (no longer with the company) 
explained to us TiVo’s efforts to forge relational ties with ecosystem incumbents:  
“We started with people that I knew and began to explain through marketing, humor and 
vision where the world was moving for media/entertainment, and where the world could 
move with interactive TV/marketing that our DVR can provide. Our intention was to find 
the champions of innovations within the organizations that we wished to partner with. We 
wanted to embrace some of the forward-thinking media executives who saw the business 
potential of the DVR and wanted to take part.” (emphasis added) 
 
TiVo’s co-founder also highlighted to us the persistence required to forge such relational ties 
despite being rebuffed repeatedly: “We knew that there will be a lot of resistance. We were thrown out of 
the office the first time and we just said that we will come back another time.” Such persistence generated 
initial cooperation from incumbents such as AOL Time Warner, DirecTV, CBS, NBC and Disney. These 

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companies were all early investors in TiVo. Some incumbents were prompted to engage due to a desire to 
“keep tabs” on TiVo’s new technology as well as the threat it posed to them. A network executive offered 
another motive: “NBC wanted to have a very loud voice in this” (Tedesco, 1999).  
Another example of such cooperation was the joint initiative between TiVo and Nielsen to gather 
data on how viewers would use the DVR. TiVo’s technology enabled the measurement of viewing 
behavior not just during live broadcasts but also when viewers recorded shows and watched them later. 
This offered finer grained information for advertisers and content providers, and led to a new way of 
measuring viewership, potentially making Nielsen’s ratings more informative and valuable to its clients.  
However, any such cooperation with TiVo also was accompanied by wariness on the part of 
incumbents. Even early investors were unsettled by the DVR’s ability to record content in digital format, 
as this would render valuable content produced by these companies worthless in the market. To safeguard 
their content and revenue streams, content providers (including TiVo’s investors such as AOL Time 
Warner, Discovery and Disney) formed a consortium called the Advanced Television Copyright Coalition 
and demanded that DVR manufacturers pay to license all content recorded by viewers for later viewing. 
Likewise, Nielsen, which had agreed to collaborate with TiVo, realized that fine-grained 
measurement made possible by TiVo’s technology would continue to raise questions about the accuracy 
and value of its established methodology for measuring viewer preferences and behaviors. Also, given 
TiVo’s stated business model of eventually monetizing such finer-gained viewer measurements, Nielsen 
was wary of TiVo eventually becoming a competitor. Accordingly, Nielsen forged competing initiatives 
and collaborative ventures such as the one with Gemstar–TV Guide International to measure interactive 
program guide usage by DVR users (Donahue, 2004).  
Such tensions were evident even in the TiVo-DirecTV partnership. DirecTV, the satellite television 
provider and TiVo’s first mass distribution partner, simultaneously engaged in competing initiatives with 
companies such as Microsoft and AOL, which also were developing digital and interactive television 
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technologies. TiVo, for its part, also pursued collaborations with other content distributors by conducting 
preliminary trials of its DVR service with Comcast and AT&T Broadband, both competitors of DirecTV.  
These dynamics illustrate the simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition in the dyadic 
relationships between TiVo and other members of the TV industry ecosystem. Gnyawali and Park (2011) 
studied similar dyadic co-opetition between Samsung and Sony, two industry “giants.” In contrast, TiVo 
was a new start-up that had to deal with relatively large and entrenched incumbents. Capturing these co-
opetitive tensions, one TiVo executive observed: “Early on, the networks and advertisers couldn’t decide 
whether to sue us or buy the company” (quoted in Wathieu and Zoglio, 2005).  
Multilateral co-opetition. While it was challenging enough to contend with intertemporal and 
dyadic co-opetition, it was all the more difficult to manage them multilaterally (i.e., across multiple dyads 
or ecosystem sides). To successfully navigate multilateral co-opetition, a firm must manage relationships 
across a set of interdependent stakeholders, with changes in one relationship affecting others (Adner, 
Oxley and Silverman, 2013; Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). Such multilateral co-opetition was 
inevitable, given TiVo’s need to create a critical mass of subscribers. As a research analyst explained:  
“The long-term success of TiVo depends on its ability to quickly build a large subscriber 
base, integrate its functionality into a broad range of consumer electronics products, and 
develop new services and programming to enhance the TiVo service. In order to achieve 
these goals, the company has aggressively pursued strategic partnerships with cable and 
satellite network operators, television programmers, consumer electronics manufacturers, 
marketing support partners and suppliers of key components of the TiVo technology.” 
(Miller, 2000: 12) 
 
TiVo began building a value network around its DVR to make it a viable platform and to offer a 
compelling value proposition to potential subscribers. However, in doing so, TiVo upset the precarious 
balance that existed in the relationships and revenue/profit sharing agreements of incumbents within the 
TV industry ecosystem. Placating one side inevitably upset another as exemplified by TiVo’s attempts to 
build a critical mass of subscribers around its DVR service. Beginning July 2000, TiVo launched an 
aggressive $150 million marketing campaign that emphasized the disruptive nature of its DVR service 
and the convenience it offered to television viewers. For instance, one TiVo commercial showed a 
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television network executive being thrown out of a window with a voice in the background saying: “Who 
needs them?” and a message in bold letters stating: “Program your own network. TiVo, TV your way.”  
However, this marketing campaign backfired with several networks including CBS (an early 
investor in TiVo) refusing to air TiVo’s commercials that disparaged network executives and emphasized 
the DVR’s disruptive potential. As an industry analyst noted: “This [TiVo’s campaign] angered the 
networks with whom TiVo was trying to partner, but did not help consumers understand what the TiVo 
service did” (quoted in Gartner, 2005). When asked about this initiative, a TiVo executive observed:  
“We had to create buzz and grab the attention of consumers. But, this also meant that we were 
predicting the downfall of incumbents and making enemies. It took us a while to repair these 
relationships later on.” 
 
Multilateral tensions were also evident in TiVo’s complex relationship with satellite television 
provider DirecTV. As described earlier, the relationship between TiVo and DirecTV was characterized by 
dyadic co-opetition. Such dyadic co-opetition spilt over when DirecTV was acquired by content provider, 
News Corp. and, soon after, announced a switch to an in-house DVR technology developed by a News 
Corp subsidiary in preference to TiVo’s DVR technology. 
TiVo’s proposed partnership with Netflix in 2004 offers yet another example of multilateral co-
opetition. This partnership involved the joint development of a service for TiVo’s subscribers to 
download movies to their DVRs over the Internet and watch them at their leisure. However, this 
partnership with Netflix, a content distributor, caused spillovers to another ecosystem side, the content 
providers. Specifically, movie studios were concerned with the lack of adequate safeguards against piracy 
of their valuable content and the potential for a significant loss of revenues. In response, they refused to 
license their content to this partnership, thereby stalling TiVo’s and Netflix’s initiative till 2008.  
Theme 2: Continual adjustments as emergent strategy 
As discussed earlier, TiVo had realized the disruptive potential of its DVR from the very beginning 
and made persistent efforts to engage with multiple incumbents within the TV industry ecosystem. To 
recapitulate, TiVo hired an executive familiar with the media industry, identified and forged relational ties 
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with forward-thinking executives in the media industry who realized the potential benefits of TiVo’s 
innovation, and formed collaborative ventures with incumbents (e.g., TV networks) to highlight its 
innovation’s potential. While such initiatives served to somewhat mitigate intertemporal co-opetitive 
tensions with incumbents, other tensions due to dyadic and multilateral co-opetition emerged. Securing 
and sustaining incumbent support and acceptance still remained a formidable challenge.  
In a few cases, tensions due to co-opetition were hard to reconcile, such as the one inherent in the 
dyadic co-opetition between TiVo and Nielsen. Given its own vision of monetizing viewer measurements 
through new services offered to advertisers, TiVo realized that this tension could not be resolved 
satisfactorily. Accordingly, TiVo opted to let the tension remain, cooperating with Nielsen to the extent 
possible while at the same time working to realize its own vision of offering measurement and ratings 
services. When asked whether TiVo’s initiatives with advertisers would make Nielsen’s service less 
valuable, a TiVo executive responded: “I think that’s happening whether TiVo offers an advertising 
product or not. Advertisers are already putting pressure on Nielsen and the networks with respect to 
program ratings and whether it’s a viable currency” (quoted in Kerschbaumer, 2005). 
In yet other cases of dyadic co-opetition, TiVo continued to engage with potential partners till a 
mutually acceptable balance could be achieved. For instance, Comcast began an initiative in 2000 to 
conduct limited trials of TiVo’s DVR with its subscribers. However, modifying its technology to work 
with legacy cable systems and proprietary set-top boxes proved challenging for TiVo, a small company 
with limited resources. TiVo’s inability (or even unwillingness) to make these changes resulted in 
Comcast deciding to withdraw and introduce its own generic DVR in 2003. Despite this setback, TiVo’s 
executives persisted in wooing Comcast. Eventually in 2005, they signed an agreement with Comcast to 
offer TiVo’s service on Comcast’s DVRs and also to jointly develop an interactive advertising platform. 
Even after this agreement was signed, it took the companies nearly two more years to resolve 
technological incompatibilities and introduce the TiVo service on a limited basis to Comcast subscribers. 
Such persistence, however, paid off for TiVo in the form of several agreements with cable and broadband 
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providers (such as Cablevision and Cox) to offer TiVo service, and the extension of the distribution 
agreement with DirecTV even after DirecTV began to use its in-house DVR technology.    
While such strategic adjustments mitigated some dyadic tensions, TiVo’s initiatives to engage with 
members of one ecosystem side also spilt over to another side, highlighting multilateral co-opetition. In 
these cases, TiVo switched dynamically to engage with the side experiencing negative spillovers so as to 
address these spillovers. For instance, consider the events that unfolded because of the multilateral tension 
between TiVo’s subscribers on the one hand, and content providers and advertisers on the other. As noted 
earlier, time-shifting of programs and fast-forwarding of commercials compromised advertisers’ and 
content providers’ efforts to reach television viewers as prime time viewing of programs was no longer be 
guaranteed. To offer a work-around, TiVo offered content providers and advertisers new options such as 
Network Showcases and TiVo Advertainment.5 TiVo even resorted to contests and prizes to entice its 
subscribers to watch commercials. These moves caught the attention of Walter Mossberg, The Wall Street 
Journal’s influential reviewer and critic of consumer technology products, who complained that TiVo 
makes “annoying efforts to get you to watch certain shows. TiVo presents you with network showcases 
which are really just come-ons. TiVo also tries to suggest shows to you, and will record them to your hard 
disk unless you opt out. That ‘feature’ makes Personal TV less personal” (Mossberg, 2001). A TiVo 
executive explained the difficult balancing act involved in staying true to the company’s commitment to 
subscribers while at the same time catering to the needs of other ecosystem sides such as advertisers: 
“We draw a line and come back to core principles about how we like to be perceived by the 
customer. Is it worth the additional advertising revenue to alienate our customer base? We 
really focus on the right balance between what the consumer needs, and what the business 
needs. It’s not black and white. At the end of the day, it’s finding that ‘sweet spot’.” 
 
In response to complaints about giving in to the industry, TiVo introduced a series of new tools to 
balance its subscribers’ interests with those of content providers and advertisers. The guiding principle 
behind these tools was to offer subscribers a choice of whether or not to engage with potentially obtrusive 

5 Network Showcases are infomercials and previews of movies, programs or products/services that may be longer 
than a typical commercial spot and offered exclusively to TiVo subscribers. TiVo Advertainment is an advertising 
program “that allows advertisers to repurpose and edit existing commercials or create entirely new advertainment 
executions without the usual time constraints for TV spots” (Elkin, 2002). 
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content such as commercials. One such tool was “tagging.” With tagging, advertisers could display a tag 
or logo with a short message even when TiVo subscribers fast-forwarded a commercial, and the 
subscriber could then choose to watch the full commercial by clicking on the tag. TiVo also offered its 
subscribers the ability to search for commercials on products or services of specific interest to them. A 
former executive explained to us how such tools converted the typically passive experience of viewing 
commercials on TV into an interactive experience that offered subscribers information relevant to their 
specific needs, and therefore received an “extraordinary response” from subscribers.  
Events associated with the company’s TiVoToGo service in 2004 offer yet another illustration of 
such dynamic switching to balance tensions due to multilateral co-opetition. The TiVoToGo service 
allowed TiVo subscribers to transfer recorded content from their DVRs to their PCs, and later to mobile 
devices such as Windows Mobile devices and iPads. This service, though offering value to subscribers, 
alarmed content providers who feared that digital recording and transfer would encourage piracy. This 
prompted the National Football League and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) to 
petition FCC to disallow TiVo’s service. However, the FCC determined that TiVo’s security safeguards 
were satisfactory and approved the TiVoToGo service (FCC 04-193, 2004). Notwithstanding FCC’s 
favorable decision, TiVo voluntarily addressed content providers’ concerns by strengthening security and 
limiting the number of devices to which subscribers could transfer content (Bangeman, 2004).  
To offer an in-depth view of how co-opetitive tensions emerge and evolve, we longitudinally 
tracked the tensions within the TiVo-DirecTV dyad in Table 3. A key observation is that co-opetitive 
tensions within the dyad ebbed and flowed over time, as each party continued to pursue its own interests 
and the ecosystem itself changed. A second observation is that any resolution of co-opetitive tensions was 
only transient, with continual adjustments needed on the part of TiVo to keep them in “balance.”    
-- Table 3 here -- 
 TiVo also had to contend with more traditional competition to its DVR box and service. Its direct 
competitor, Replay TV, had proved to be a weak competitive threat after it strongly antagonized 
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ecosystem incumbents by offering features such as commercial skip and sharing of recorded 
programming among its subscribers. Replay faced lawsuits from major movie studios alleging copyright 
violations, and in 2003 was forced into a bankruptcy filing and sale. However, TiVo faced significant 
indirect competition from generic DVRs introduced by cable and satellite providers, and telephone 
companies that had entered the television industry. To mitigate such competition and also to defend its 
intellectually property, in 2004, TiVo sued Echostar, the parent of satellite TV provider DISH, alleging 
patent infringement. After several rounds of appeals and countersuits, TiVo conclusively won this lawsuit 
in 2011, with Echostar agreeing to pay $500 million to TiVo over a period of 6 years and licensing the 
technologies in dispute. This verdict and settlement set a favorable precedent for TiVo, which also 
selectively sued telephone companies that had entered the TV business (e.g., AT&T, Verizon and 
Motorola Mobility Holdings) for patent infringement when they were not inclined to negotiate licensing 
agreements with the company. However, as a TiVo executive explained, the company had to balance its 
aggressive protection of its intellectual property by re-affirming its desire to collaborate with incumbents: 
 “Our basic technology can be duplicated. Cable and satellite providers could abscond with 
our technology so we had to instigate litigation to protect our IP….But we also had to 
weave our way into the fabric of the media industry. So, we then had to evangelize by 
highlighting our enhanced user experience and presenting a vision of how our technology 
can take them to TV’s future.” 
 
As these illustrative examples highlight, TiVo made continual adjustments to its strategy to address 
emergent co-opetitive tensions and find a dynamic, workable balance between competing and cooperating 
with various ecosystem members. Such adjustments were facilitated by changes in top management 
(beginning 2002-03 and culminating in 2005) and the attendant business-oriented, more collaborative 
mindset. According to a TiVo executive:  
“Despite trying to collaborate from the beginning, we still had an “engineering” mindset 
and an “us-versus-them” mentality with respect to our technology. It was not easy to deal 
with DirecTV and Comcast with such a mindset, but they became more receptive when 
they realized that the company was changing. We showed them that we could be flexible 
and deal with the complexity of their products (e.g., Comcast’s cable systems). Slowly, 
they realized it was a better deal for them to work with us. All this took time, though.” 
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Theme 3: Evolution of TiVo’s technology platform and relational positioning within the ecosystem 
Continual strategic adjustments made by the disruptor to address emergent co-opetitive tensions 
have consequences for its technology, capabilities and, eventually, its place in an ecosystem that itself is 
evolving. In TiVo’s case, over time, such strategic adjustments resulted in significant changes to its DVR 
technology platform as well as its relational positioning vis-à-vis industry incumbents.  
As TiVo engaged with multiple sides and dealt with emergent co-opetitive tensions, its DVR 
platform and service evolved. For instance, TiVo responded to competition from generic DVRs offered 
by cable and satellite TV providers by releasing new generations of its DVR with enhanced functionality 
and features. Examples include DVRs with the ability to access personal content from PCs through the 
Internet. In addition, as noted earlier, TiVo integrated innovative advertising tools such as tagging, which 
advertisers could use to offer targeted and interactive commercials only to interested subscribers. Besides, 
partnerships with a number of content distributors and providers such as Amazon, NY Times, CNET and 
the NBA increased the content options for subscribers.  
With all these enhancements, TiVo’s services became more popular, with one analyst even noting: 
“They are like Kleenex. Their brand name defines the entire product category” (quoted in Van, 2005). 
Later, based on CEO Tom Rogers’s talk at Bear Stearns' annual media conference, another analyst noted: 
“The bottom line: TiVo is in transition from a company that sells subsidized DVR boxes to a company 
that sells viewer metrics, DVR software as a service over cable boxes, and expensive, unsubsidized hi-
definition DVR boxes” (quoted in Frommer, 2008). A TiVo executive re-iterated this point to us:  
“We are content agnostic, so wherever your content is from – tape, cable, over-the-air 
network broadcasts, Netflix, Amazon, Hulu, YouTube – we support all of them on our 
platform. What we want to create is the best user experience across all those platforms.” 
 
Indeed, TiVo was becoming the “Google of video content” (Grover, 2009).  
To further explore the evolution of TiVo’s DVR platform, we gathered and analyzed data on 
TiVo’s portfolio of patents over time. Our analysis showed that TiVo aggressively built its intellectual 
property. For instance, TiVo’s portfolio of patents increased from just 33 in 2000 to 238 in 2011. In 
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addition to patenting internally developed technology, TiVo also acquired or cross-licensed key patents 
pertaining to DVR technology from firms such as IBM and Digital. Moreover, TiVo continued to extend 
its existing IP to offer new DVR functionality and new tools and services. Whereas a third of TiVo’s 
patents filed between 1998 and 2011 disclosed new inventions, another third were continuation patents 
(i.e., additional claims or extensions of an already disclosed invention) or continuation-in-part patents 
(i.e., disclosure of a new invention partially derived from an already disclosed invention).  
Several TiVo executives whom we interviewed highlighted the importance of patents in increasing 
TiVo’s bargaining power during negotiations: “Our strategy is ‘Speak softly but carry a big stick’” and 
“We prefer to partner with others, but we reserve this (patent protection) for a rainy day if someone 
comes after us.” However, TiVo’s CEO also acknowledged to us the limitations of relying on patents: 
“You can’t hold a gun to people’s head. (With this approach), you can’t have the strategic 
partners that you need. So, you need patents but you also need a superior product going 
forward. You can extract value from IP but it can’t be your backbone like your operating 
business…Patent earnings can be a band-aid but cannot sustain long-term viability.” 
 
TiVo’s increasing technological prowess and its well-differentiated DVR platform resulted in 
partnerships with dominant content distributors such as Comcast and Cox, offering a degree of legitimacy 
to TiVo within the TV industry ecosystem. The increase in the company’s subscriber base to over 4 
million by 2006-07 also made it possible to recruit larger and more representative samples of viewers to 
track and offer real-time, precise data on viewer behaviors and preferences. In 2006, TiVo created a new 
division to offer research and analysis to advertisers, and also introduced services to track and report 
second-by-second viewing behavior to content providers. By 2007, TiVo, in partnership with Starcom, 
was tracking a panel of 20,000 subscribers, whereas Nielsen’s ratings and audience measurements at that 
time were reportedly derived from a representative sample of just 5,000 television households. 
A consequence of all these developments was a shift in TiVo’s content and service offerings. With 
these new tools and services, the promised benefits of the DVR to various ecosystem sides began to be 
realized. Slowly, ecosystem incumbents too began to view TiVo not as an “ad-killer” or destroyer of 
“television as we know it” (Dignam, 2000) but as an ad-enhancer and enabler of interactive television. 



22
TiVo’s executives used these developments to reframe the company’s relational positioning within the 
TV industry ecosystem as a ‘connector’ of various sides facilitating collective value creation, instead of a 
‘disruptor’ perceived as destroying or appropriating existing value. Speaking directly to the notion of 
TiVo’s changing role and perception within the industry, TiVo’s CEO Tom Rogers, commented: 
“Just a few years ago, we were viewed with great paranoia as the disruptor…Our goal now 
is to work with the media industry to come up with ways to resist the downward pressure 
of less advertising viewing and create a way for advertising on TV to become more 
effective, more engaging and closer to the sale.” (quoted in Stone, 2008) 
 
He explained to us how TiVo accomplished this change in perception from disruptor to connector:  
“We evangelized to everyone in the industry. We explained that we were not trying to 
destroy their business models. Rather, we were pro-consumer and promoting on-demand 
viewing which is more profitable…That we could help cable operators to recreate their 
business models. We communicated that we weren’t just a technology company but a 
hybrid trying to develop both media capital and technology capital.” 
 
Indeed, TiVo was already gaining wider acceptance within the ecosystem, increasingly viewed as a 
sustaining force instead of the initially perceived disruptive influence. For instance, the National 
Academy of Television Arts and Sciences recognized TiVo with Emmy awards in 2006 and 2007 
respectively for its role in pioneering interactive television and advertising. This major change in the 
company’s relational positioning was also manifest in the increasing willingness of key incumbents to 
partner with the company. Partly, as a research analyst noted, such willingness (especially on the part of 
content distributors) was driven by the fear of infringing TiVo’s growing portfolio of patents: 
“Pay TV operators who have not yet properly licensed the right to provide DVR services in 
the vein set forth by TiVo's patents might well be at risk of patent infringement claims. 
Therefore, in due time, we think that nearly all Pay TV operators will review their risks and 
opt to legitimize their DVR offerings.” (quoted in Simons, 2008) 
 
In a virtuous circle, TiVo’s platform gained further momentum as both established and new firms 
adopted its services. For instance, in 2007, NBC Universal began using second-by-second viewership 
data and ratings information offered by TiVo. Likewise, in 2008, Netflix partnered with TiVo to stream 
its movies on a variety of devices to TiVo’s subscribers. A TiVo executive explained to us the bandwagon 
effect that key partnerships (e.g., Netflix) generated for the company:  
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“As consumers by the droves began to watch content on many devices like the iPad, 
television sets and iPhones, companies like Netflix began to feel, ‘Wow, this is scary; we 
have got to respond. We have got to work with these guys (TiVo).’ Netflix is now one of 
our biggest allies, and this has helped to change the perceptions of other incumbents.” 
 
Summary: TiVo’s emergent strategy  
 Clearly, TiVo’s position within the ecosystem changed since its inception when it introduced a 
revolutionary product, one that in 2005 won PC Magazine’s third best product of all times just behind 
Apple II. A TiVo executive noted that TiVo was continuing to forge ahead from being a company that 
sold DVRs (which was becoming a commodity) to one that added value through its software, which he 
likened to “the operating system of a computer.” He noted that, looking forward, TiVo planned to solidify 
its position within the TV industry ecosystem, which was itself changing to accommodate the concept of 
“anytime, anywhere television experience” through a multitude of devices and services. 
But, this new positioning had not come easily. TiVo’s DVR technology initially was perceived to 
be disruptive by key industry incumbents. Whatever benefits the technology promised was contingent on 
TiVo being able to gain the support of the very ecosystem incumbents it stood to disrupt, and attaining a 
critical mass of subscribers for its service. We labelled this tension as intertemporal co-opetition – 
whereas the benefits were uncertain and realized only in the future, the threat of disruption was perceived 
by industry incumbents in the present. As discussed earlier, TiVo attempted to mitigate intertemporal co-
opetitive tension to the extent possible by presenting a more familiar face, making conciliatory gestures, 
and engaging with forward-thinking executives within incumbent firms. Whether motivated by a desire to 
keep tabs on the threat or to influence the technology’s evolution in ways beneficial to the industry, 
several key incumbents chose to invest in and collaborate with TiVo initially.  
However, any such collaborations were beset by dyadic co-opetition because incumbents were still 
wary of the disruptive threat posed by TiVo’s DVR. In addition, given the inherently conflict-ridden 
relationships among various ecosystem sides, TiVo attempts to build a critical mass of subscribers and 
simultaneously engage with multiple incumbents, engendered multilateral co-opetition within and across 
ecosystem sides. Any attempt to mitigate one co-opetitive tension frequently led to the emergence of 
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others. TiVo attempted to deal with dyadic co-opetition by persistently engaging with incumbents, all the 
while making its offerings (and thus its brand) more valuable and visible to viewers and, thereby, making 
it in incumbents’ interest to continue collaboration. TiVo also engaged different sides by introducing new 
tools that enabled workarounds to the disruptive aspects of the DVR in fast forwarding commercials and 
time-shifting programming. When engagement with one side caused negative spillovers to other sides, 
TiVo switched dynamically to engage with these sides to mitigate the effects of such spillovers.  
However, as our analysis revealed, some tensions were irreconcilable. In such cases, TiVo 
collaborated to the extent possible and let the residual tensions remain. At an extreme, TiVo even took 
aggressive actions to protect its intellectual property and limit imitation (e.g., suing DISH for patent 
infringement). Such aggression had a cost, with TiVo being labelled “as a black hat” by wary industry 
incumbents, and the company then had to soften its image over time by emphasizing the benefits of its 
technology and its ability to be flexible in collaborative initiatives. 
Over time, such dynamic adjustments paid off for TiVo. With new management promoting a more 
collaborative and accommodating mindset, TiVo became more receptive to incumbents’ needs in 
introducing new features, tools and services. With each such enhancement, TiVo’s technology platform 
evolved to offer more and more benefits to key ecosystem sides such as television viewers, advertisers, 
content providers and, thereby, to content distributors. With its subscriber base growing to reach critical 
mass, TiVo was able to deliver on its initial vision to offer more targeted and interactive reach to a broad 
demographic of television viewers. As benefits began to flow to various sides, the tension due to 
intertemporal co-opetition abated, and the relational positioning of TiVo within the industry too changed. 
TiVo’s DVR technology came to be perceived as a sustaining (instead of a disruptive) innovation 
enabling the ecosystem to evolve towards the promised future of interactive television.  
DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 We began the paper by asking how a firm, especially a start-up, can address the challenges in 
introducing its disruptive innovation into an established ecosystem. Our findings on TiVo’s experiences 
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in introducing its DVR into the U.S. TV ecosystem offered several insights, which we articulated as 
themes in the previous section. In this section, we use these insights to propose a process model of the 
disruptor’s dilemma and its potential resolution. We also highlight the contributions of our study to 
different literature streams.  
A process model 
 Figure 1 highlights key process elements associated with the disruptor’s dilemma. Disruptive 
innovations are ‘double-edged’ swords – innovations that are breakthroughs with the potential to spawn 
new markets also imply breaking apart existing ecosystem arrangements, and fueling adverse reactions 
from incumbents. Consequently, the disruptor confronts a dilemma; how to gain support and acceptance 
from the very ecosystem incumbents who stand to be disrupted. This dilemma is all the more difficult to 
resolve due to tensions generated by intertemporal, dyadic and multilateral co-opetition.  
-- Figure 1 here -- 
Observations from the TiVo case highlight how these co-opetitive tensions play out over time, and 
how the disruptor’s actions to mitigate some tensions may aggravate others. Our findings also show that 
not all tensions are attributable to the disruptor’s actions, as for example the change in the nature of the 
TiVo-DirecTV relationship from a collaborative to a significantly more competitive one after DirecTV’s 
acquisition by NewsCorp. Indeed, the balance between cooperation and competition continues to shift in 
such dynamic settings, and the disruptor needs to adjust accordingly. 
The growing literature on paradoxes and their resolution (e.g., Cameron and Quinn, 1988; Poole 
and Van de Ven, 1989; Smith and Lewis, 2011) offers a holistic frame to understand how a disruptor can 
potentially manage co-opetitive tensions. A disruptor may choose to accept the tensions and harness these 
to its advantage. Alternatively, the disruptor may switch dynamically over time to deal with one or the 
other tension in turn, as exemplified in the notion of pivoting (Garud, Lant & Schildt, 2014; Marx, Gans 
and Hsu, 2014; Ries, 2011). Or, with time, the disruptor may offer a new frame that helps resolve the 
underlying tensions. As our findings demonstrate, TiVo resorted to each of these approaches at various 
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points till such time it was able to reframe itself as a connector facilitating collective value creation within 
the ecosystem. Such a longitudinal perspective enables an exploration of how tensions among different 
constituents of an ecosystem interact and evolve over time and, how a disruptor might transcend the 
traditional dualism between cooperation and competition.  
In performing a juggling act to secure the support of ecosystem incumbents, a disruptor employs a 
mix of “soft power” and “hard power” (Nye, 2004). Soft power involves the exercise of what Fligstein 
(1997) termed social and political skills to generate desired outcomes. On the other hand, hard power 
involves the use of threats, sanctions or other coercive strategies to secure compliance (Wilson, 2008). 
TiVo employed both. It forged collaborative relationships, made adjustments to manage co-opetitive 
tensions and spillovers, and leveraged its growing brand and technological capabilities to generate 
relational advantage (Chen and Miller, 2015). The deployment of hard power was evident in TiVo’s 
aggressive pursuit of IP infringement claims against incumbents. These claims, once upheld in court, 
increased TiVo’s bargaining power, enabling it to solidify its position within the TV industry ecosystem.  
To the extent that the disruptor’s technology offers degrees of freedom (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 
1995) and the company has the technological skills to leverage them, all these accommodations lead to 
changes to its technological platform over time. For instance, TiVo was able to offer new interactive tools 
enabling advertisers to work around the tendency of DVR users to fast-forward through commercials. The 
company also was able to make its software compatible with cable manufacturers’ legacy systems and 
technology. These changes highlight the co-emergence of social and technical structures during the 
transformation of an industry ecosystem (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995). 
Transformation of the disruptor’s technological platform represents changes in its overall co-
opetitive capabilities. With such developments, the nature of value creation and appropriation too may 
change from a zero sum game to a positive sum game (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). 
Correspondingly, a shift occurs from an “egocentric” view wherein the introduction of an innovation 
breaks things apart to an “allocentric” view that emphasizes bringing actors together (Lado, Boyd and 
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Hanlon, 1997) through collaborative networks (Ansari and Munir, 2008). In TiVo’s case, progressive 
changes to its DVR platform to accommodate different sides enabled it to morph from a hardware 
company offering DVR boxes to a software company offering an “operating system” for use in a variety 
of devices and, over time, to reframe its technology and relational positioning as being sustaining to 
ecosystem incumbents instead of being disruptive.  
In sum, navigating the minefield of co-opetitive tensions is not an easy task for a disruptor, 
especially a start-up firm with limited resources. Though TiVo has so far managed to survive and gain 
acceptance within the TV industry ecosystem, success for the company and for other similarly placed 
start-ups is not guaranteed (Park and Russo, 1996). It is in these uncertain situations that a process model 
like ours, one that explores the drivers and dynamics underlying the phenomenon, adds value.  
Indeed, our model resonates with the recent experiences of ‘disruptors’ in diverse industries. For 
instance, Uber Technologies, a smartphone-based ride-sourcing service has followed an ‘in-your-face’ 
expansion strategy as it “barreled” into new markets around the world. Uber and its executives have 
become known for their aggressive and confrontational stance towards the taxi industry, regulators, 
competitors, journalists who criticized the company, and even the company’s own customers and drivers. 
Such a stance has led even Uber’s supporters to ask whether the company’s aggressive attitude might 
make it difficult for it to develop or maintain partnerships with other companies such as Starbucks that 
value their hard-earned image (Isaac, 2015). More recently, however, Uber executives have started 
adopting a new “gentler”, “white glove” strategy of compromise and diplomacy (Isaac, 2015; Macmillan 
and Fleisher, 2015). For instance, Uber has hired seasoned executives to handle its public relations and 
communication strategy, negotiated with regulators in many cities around the world, strengthened its 
privacy policies to protect its customers’ information, and engaged in charitable activities to soften its 
image. Even though Uber is not as dependent on ecosystem incumbents as TiVo was, its recent responses 
show how even a popular and rapidly growing disruptor needs to be more accommodative even as it 
attempts to transform the existing ecosystem.  
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An additional example that resonates with the key thesis of this paper is Pandora, a company that 
delivers audio to mobile devices and dominates Internet radio. Pandora antagonized the music industry by 
aggressively pushing for lower royalty rates, and unsustainable payments. Once it became the target of 
incumbent pushback and resistance, Pandora has tried to repair its relationships in the music world by 
creating a new division to engage with labels and artist managers, allowing access to its vast databanks, 
and experimenting with artist promotions through the Artist Marketing Platform (Sisaro, 2015).  
As these examples from different industries illustrate, it is not unusual for disruptors to switch to a 
positive sum approach of engaging with industry incumbents to mitigate tensions and potentially gain 
acceptance. However, as our findings suggest, incumbents may be receptive to making accommodations 
with the disruptor only if it is able to attract a critical mass of consumers to its innovation. 
Contribution to literature on disruptive innovation 
Ever since Christensen (1997) highlighted the processes through which disruptive innovations 
eventually destroy an incumbent’s core value proposition, the topic continues to attract both scholarly 
interest (e.g., Danneels, 2004; Govindarajan, Kopalle and Danneels, 2011) as well as popular attention 
(Lepore, 2014). Incumbents may be unable to renew their resource portfolio, or fail to develop 
capabilities to cope with environmental changes (e.g., Danneels, 2010; Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). In 
addition, their internal resource-allocation processes result in a systematic underinvestment in disruptive 
technologies. This poses a dilemma for incumbents (i.e., the innovator’s dilemma) as to whether and how 
they themselves might invest in and pursue a potentially disruptive innovation, instead of focusing on the 
needs of their current customers and allowing others to disrupt their markets.  
However, new entrants introducing disruptive innovations into an existing ecosystem also confront 
a dilemma – how to gain the support of the very incumbents that stand to be disrupted. Complicating 
matters, many aspiring disruptors also experience “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965) including 
lack of legitimacy (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001), customer indifference (Rosenberg, 1982), incumbent 
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skepticism (Marx, Gans and Hsu, 2014) and lack of co-specialized assets (Teece, 1986), all of which 
undermine their efforts to introduce and establish their innovations.  
By taking a disruptor’s perspective, we add to an understanding of the challenges confronted by 
disruptors and extend the literature on disruptive innovation. First, while it has been acknowledged that 
disruption is not a one shot event or “a carefully planned forward march” but rather a process 
(Christensen, 2006; Christensen and Raynor 2003), our analysis highlights the various co-opetitive 
tensions that disruptors confront during the process. Second, our analysis shows how a disruptor might 
address these tensions, further extending classical perspectives that view innovations as being either 
disruptive or sustaining (Christensen, 1997). In contrast to such essentialist views, our analysis 
demonstrates the strategic actions available to a disruptor to frame its innovation in alternative ways (cf., 
Gurses and Ozcan, 2014), and the use of soft and hard power to secure cooperation from incumbents (cf., 
Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Specifically, such reframing involves a change in emphasis from the 
“disruptive” aspect of the innovation that upstages established incumbents, to the beneficial aspect of the 
innovation that can enhance the value generated for and by various incumbents within the ecosystem. 
Third, while disruptive innovations have often been characterized as having an impact on specific 
incumbent firms (typically direct competitors), our analysis demonstrates how such innovations may 
affect the entire ecosystem by reconfiguring the relational interdependencies among various ecosystem 
members. This dynamic is not limited to TiVo. Polaroid’s landmark innovation, the SX-70 camera 
affected the entire photography ecosystem, including Polaroid’s relationships with key stakeholders, such 
as its film and battery suppliers, Kodak and ESB, respectively (Garud and Munir, 2008). These 
observations highlight the need for adopting a systemic view of how disruptive innovations can affect 
various relationships within an ecosystem instead of focusing just on a specific set of incumbents.  
Contribution to literature on co-opetitive dynamics  
Insights from our analysis confirm and extend prior observations on co-opetition. Co-opetition 
between two firms is walking “a fine line between cooperating with partners in good faith and 
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maintaining a posture of vigorous competition with rivals” (Gnyawali, He and Madhavan, 2006: 509; 
Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). Besides such dyadic co-opetition, we highlight how disruptors must navigate 
dependencies and consequent spillovers across multiple dyads and multiple ecosystem sides (i.e., 
multilateral co-opetition) to realize the value proposition inherent in the innovation. This leads to a 
continual shift in the balance between cooperation and competition (Gnyawali and Park, 2011).  
In addition, we highlight yet another kind of co-opetition – intertemporal co-opetition, i.e., how a 
disruptor has to gain cooperation from incumbents it disrupts with promises of benefits that might accrue 
only in an uncertain future. This is a classic “chicken-and-egg” problem, or the challenge of attracting 
sufficient number of adopters under uncertainty to build critical mass on different sides of a platform 
(Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Evans, Hagiu, and Schmalensee, 2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2003). The 
disruptor may attempt to set future expectations through projective stories to attract the support of 
ecosystem members (Garud, Schildt and Lant, 2014). However, such expectations may also serve as a 
source of future disappointments (Ansari and Garud, 2009), especially when a disruptor’s attempts to 
accommodate one side create problems for another. Failure to manage such disappointments may result in 
a loss of legitimacy with certain ecosystem members and initiate a snowball effect with more serious and 
systemic consequences. Such considerations further complicate the disruptor’s dilemma, and highlight the 
importance of the continual juggling act a disruptor must perform to cope with these diverse tensions. As 
discussed in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Garud, Gehman and Giuliani, (2014)), a start-up must 
continue to re-contextualize its entrepreneurial journey on an ongoing basis.  
Contribution to literature on industry ecosystems and strategy as process  
Studies on industry ecosystems have shown how interdependent firms must work together to co-
create value, and how the success of one firm depends on the success of others (Adner et al., 2013). 
However, there is a presumption that pre-meditated roles and links among ecosystem members exist and 
remain stable over time. By contrast, our study highlights the evolution of the disruptor’s innovation and, 
along with it, the evolution of existing rules, roles and relationships within the ecosystem, as the disruptor 
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continually adjusts its strategy to deal with emerging co-opetitive tensions. This co-evolutionary process 
continues till an overall collective frame emerges within the ecosystem, one that can hold together the 
different actors around the innovation in a delicate balance. This represents a shift in the disruptor’s 
relational positioning within the ecosystem from a standalone approach that entails exploiting other 
parties (tertius iungens) to an integrated approach that links disconnected parties through combinative 
activity (tertius gaudens) (Obstfeld, 2005). 
These insights also add to the literature on strategy as process (Bower and Gilbert, 2005; 
Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), which has seen resurgence of late (e.g., Mirabeau and 
Maguire, 2014). Our study shows that strategy for a disruptor is an uneven process that does not follow a 
natural trajectory or logic set in advance. Instead, it requires “muddling through” (Lindblom, 1959) and 
“logical incrementalism” (Quinn, 1978) within an ecosystem that itself is co-emerging. Eventually, as the 
ecosystem evolves to accommodate the innovation, the disruptor can shift its relational positioning from 
that of a value destroyer to a value creator, and thereby convert ‘head-winds’ to ‘tail-winds.’ Overall, our 
analysis shows how disruptors can gain a foothold within the ecosystem by limiting incumbents’ hostility 
and retaliation (Carmeli and Markman, 2011; Kotha, Zheng and George, 2011; Markman and Waldron 
2014) and progressively establishing symbiotic relationships with them. 
CONCLUSION 
The typical advice given to firms is that they should take the initiative and become the disruptor to 
avoid being disrupted by others. Our study shows that disruption itself is not a straightforward process, 
and that the journey is fraught with challenges arising from co-opetitive tensions. In showcasing these 
challenges, our study raises several questions and opens up new avenues for research. For instance, how 
does a disruptor generate a vision of the future that is compelling enough to persuade incumbents to 
support its innovation despite the clear and present threat of disruption? Also, how might a disruptor’s 
efforts to muddle through in addressing emergent co-opetitive tensions affect its legitimacy and its 
relational positioning within the ecosystem?  
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Yet other research opportunities emerge when we consider boundary conditions applicable to this 
study. TiVo’s technological platform had sufficient degrees of freedom enabling it to marshal its 
technological skills to accommodate the needs of ecosystem incumbents over time. What if the 
disruptor’s technology (or business model) were not so malleable? In such a case, what other strategies 
are available for the disruptor to manage co-opetitive tensions and gain acceptance? Another boundary 
condition pertains to the nature of the ecosystem itself. The TV industry ecosystem is systemic and 
complex, with multiple sides and conflict-ridden relationships within and across sides. However, other 
ecosystems may have different characteristics, some closed and others more open, some stable and others 
more dynamic, some with high levels of relational interdependencies and others with much lower levels 
(Koenig, 2012; Moore, 2006; Wareham et al., 2014). By examining the process of disruptive innovation 
in these settings, we can generate a more robust set of insights.  
For instance, to the extent that an ecosystem is closed and has lower levels of relational 
interdependencies among its constituents, multilateral co-opetition may be less of an issue. But, to the 
extent that an ecosystem is open and relatively unbounded, disruption in one industry ecosystem may 
reverberate across others associated with it. As an example, consider the auto industry, in which the recent 
emergence of a mobility ecosystem around “autonomous vehicles” or self-driving cars stands to impact not just 
auto manufacturers, computer/communication technology firms, energy companies and public transportation 
providers, but also regulators, infrastructure and construction companies, insurance companies, and city 
planners. Examining how previously distinctive industries dissolve into complex ecosystems is another 
promising research avenue. 
In conclusion, our study builds upon existing literatures to offer new insights and raise questions 
for further exploration. Specifically, by theorizing on the disruptor’s dilemma, our study sensitizes 
scholars to dynamics associated with disruptive innovations over time and the diverse co-opetitive 
tensions that a disruptor must manage. Additional research can help refine the themes that we have 
developed in this paper.  
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Table 1: Data Sources 
Data source Details 
Interviews  x Interviews of seven current and former TiVo senior executives, conducted 
telephonically or during visits to TiVo headquarters during early 2015.   
x 24 audio/video files or transcripts of interviews (ranging from 3 minutes to 
36 minutes and conducted between the period 2002-2012) of TiVo 
executives and industry analysts conducted by journalists in news programs 
(e.g., Bloomberg TV, CNBC, Fox News, NPR, CNET Reporter’s 
roundtable, etc.,) 
x Interviews of TiVo executives published in news articles by the business 
press and trade press, books and online blogs (e.g., WSJ’s All Things 
Digital, Engadget, PVRblog, iinovate.blogspot.com, thomashawk.com).  
Published cases, articles and 
comments/commentaries, 
reports on TiVo and the 
entertainment/television 
industries 
x Articles and comments/commentaries published in the business/trade press 
and online blogs between 1995 and 2012, accessed from databases (such as 
Lexis-Nexis and ABI/INFORM Global) and through extensive Google 
searches 
x 54 equities analysts’ and industry analysts’ reports on TiVo and 
DVR/television/entertainment industries published between 1998 and 2012, 
accessed from Mergent Online and ThomsonONE databases. 
x 7 Harvard Business School and Northwestern Kellogg School cases on 
TiVo. 
x Academic articles on TiVo and the entertainment/television industries 
downloaded through keyword searches of SSRN, JSTOR and Google 
Scholar. 
TiVo website, and other online 
sources (e.g., SEC Edgar, 
Internet Archive) 
x SEC filings (IPO prospectus, Annual reports, 10-Q reports and 10-K 
reports between 1999 and 2012) 
x TiVo news releases (since founding to 2012)  
x List of US patents covering technologies used in TiVo’s DVR 
products/service 
Company and industry 
directories, Trade/industry 
association websites 
x Company histories on key industry players from directories such as Gales 
Directory, Hoover’s. 
x Industry reports/outlook and publications from Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s. 
x News releases and reports published by industry associations (e.g., 
National Cable and Telecommunications Association, Motion Picture 
Association of America) 
Federal Communications 
Commission website 
x FCC news releases 
x Transcripts of speeches made by FCC commissioners at trade and industry 
associations/conferences 
x FCC industry reports 
x Filings, comments related to FCC rulemaking and reports (downloaded by 
keyword search of FCC’s Electronic Comment Filing System and 
Electronic Document Management System) 
x Court appeals, briefs filed by industry actors and interest groups 
subsequent to FCC rulemaking 
US Patent and Trademarks 
Office database and The Lens 
(http://www.lens.org/about/) 
x US patents awarded to TiVo between 1998 and 2012 
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Table 2: Illustrative Thematic Analysis of TiVo and the U.S. Television Industry Ecosystem7 
  
Data/Excerpts/Quotations/Vignettes Sub-Themes Themes 
TiVo’s future vision: “TiVo believes that our TiVo Service will offer advertisers a new platform with more efficient and 
effective ways to reach their targeted audience.” (2000 TiVo 10-K report, p8) 
 
Disruption in the present due to TiVo’s DVR: And then we had to think about (the fact that)…broadcasters – television 
networks – rely a lot on commercials to make their money…(In) fact many of them rely exclusively on commercials to 
make their money, and here we are … fast forwarding through commercials and messing around with prime time and 
surf.” (Mike Ramsay interview, iinovate.blogspot.com, 2006). 
  
“They [the media companies] were already on razor-thin margins and it was logical for them to think of short-term effects 
of our DVR technology on their business.” (TiVo executive we interviewed). 
 
Intertemporal      
co-opetition 
Co-opetitive 
Tensions 
“TiVo, which allows viewers to digitally record programs and fast-forward through ads, is trying to sell ad spaces on 
its screens. It is in a footrace with other companies, including Cablevision, Cox Communications and DirecTV, to offer 
interactive alternatives to the zapped-through television spots. ...” (Advertising, Apr 23, 2009) Note: Cablevision, Cox 
and DirecTV are TiVo’s distribution partners; DirecTV also offers its own DVR to subscribers, apart from TiVo’s DVR.  
 
Dyadic               
co-opetition 
 
“Some advertising executives said that they were excited at the prospect of having access to data from TiVo recorders, 
which can offer some details that are not captured in the industry's standard ratings by Nielsen Media Research….Rogers 
said he hoped that TiVo's new research would help advertisers bargain for better deals from networks. "All this money has 
changed hands in the TV advertising business, when there has not been any data given by the rating agencies about the 
watching of advertisements," he said….Nielsen has started to measure how video recorders are used, but it has been 
caught in a fight between the networks and advertisers about how to classify the data it gathers.” (International Herald 
Tribune Jul 26, 2006). 
 
Multilateral         
co-opetition 
 
 
 
Receives equity investments from several leading media companies, cable companies, network broadcasters, including 
CBS, Comcast, Discovery, Disney. "This round of investment marks a major step forward in the adoption and validation 
of TiVo's service" (Mike Ramsay, TiVo co-founder, quoted in PR Newswire, July 27, 1999). 
 
“There was also a lot of emotional reactions in the executive suite. So, one of the very first thing I did was to sit down with 
the research icons of the TV networks and show them what we were doing. These folks are likely to be more objective and 
less emotional about data on how consumers were using the TiVo product and make the intellectual leap to the impact on 
their business – short-term and long-term – and the opportunity ahead to get into this stream of innovation and begin to 
provide feedback on the innovations.” (TiVo executive we interviewed).  
Engaging with 
multiple 
incumbents 
initially to get 
buy-in 
Continual 
adjustments 
by TiVo 

7 This is only a subset of our analysis, included here for illustrative purposes. The complete set is available from authors on request. Portions of the text have 
been italicized for emphasis.  
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Table 2: Illustrative Thematic Analysis of TiVo and the U.S. Television Industry Ecosystem (continued) 
  
Data/Excerpts/Quotations/Vignettes Sub-Themes Themes 
I think that’s happening whether TiVo offers an advertising product or not. Advertisers are already putting pressure on 
Nielsen and the networks with respect to program ratings and whether it’s a viable currency”. ((Davina Kent, TiVo VP, 
national advertising sales, quoted in interview with Kerschbaumer, Broadcasting & Cable, December 2, 2005). 
 
Living with 
hard-to-resolve 
tensions  
Continual 
adjustments 
by TiVo 
(continued)
“TiVo Inc. on Monday introduced a feature that lets television viewers send personal information directly to advertisers 
when they see certain commercials, a move designed to open up TiVo's technology to more markets. The move 
underscores advertising's importance to the future of TiVo. It comes a few years after TiVo's introduction sent a chill 
through the ad sector with technology that let TV watchers skip over ads... However, TiVo says the changes will not affect 
the way users view shows and skip ads, and will not force them to watch any ads they choose to ignore.” (Los Angeles 
Times, July 19, 2005). 
 
Dynamically 
switching to 
address negative 
spillovers to 
different side(s) 
 
“Unable to strike a deal with either of the major phone companies that offer TV services, TiVo on Wednesday sued them 
both…TiVo has already taken Dish for more than $200 million and a judge has slapped a permanent injunction, now being 
appealed, against Dish…"We need to stop their continued use of our intellectual property," TiVo CEO Tom Rogers said 
Wednesday during a conference call with analysts to discuss quarterly financial results…Rogers was asked more than once 
why TiVo has been so selective about its lawsuits, leaving out cable operators and the makers of set-top boxes, for 
example…Rogers dodged such queries except to indicate that negotiations with cablers have been going better than they 
had with Dish and the phone companies. Comcast, for example, has launched its service with TiVo in New England and 
will do so soon in Chicago.” (Adweek, August 27, 2009). 
 
Selectively 
dealing with 
DVR 
competition 
 
Growth in patents as indicator of TiVo’s technological capabilities: # of patents in Dec 2001: 33 patents awarded; 99 
patents pending, whereas the # of patents in Jan 2012: 238 patents awarded; 413 patents pending (TiVo 1999 IPO 
prospectus and TiVo 10-K reports). 
New sources of revenues due to the evolution of TiVo’s technology platform and capabilities: “We primarily generate 
revenues from four sources: Consumer Service….Television Service Providers or MSOs….Media Services….Licensing 
Revenues…” (2012 TiVo 10-K, p. 6). 
 
Evolution of 
DVR platform 
and services 
Evolution of 
TiVo’s 
Technology 
Platform and 
Relational 
Positioning 
“For years TiVo was perceived as a pariah because it allows viewers to zip through TV ads. When former NBC executive 
Tom Rogers took over as TiVo CEO in July 2005, he made it part of his mission to smooth over relations with 
broadcasters, cable providers, and advertisers…The olive branches Rogers is offering TiVo's former adversaries, it turns 
out, are also areas of expected revenue growth. Last year, for instance, TiVo rolled out its Stop Watch audience 
measurement service, inking recent deals with NBC and CBS, to track consumers' minute-by-minute viewing habits. 
"With two major networks on board, other networks likely will have to subscribe to the data as well, as will the ad 
agencies and advertisers," noted Bear Stearns analyst, Kunal Madhukar. "And as such, CBS's decision was critical to the 
service gaining general acceptance in the industry." TiVo also unveiled a similar service that will provide advertisers with 
information about how viewers respond to (or fast-forward through) commercial spots.” (CNNMoney, March 5, 2008). 
Evolution of 
relational 
positioning 
from that of 
disruptor and 
value destroyer 
to one of 
partner and 
value creator 
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Table 3: Evolution of Co-opetitive Tensions within the TiVo-DirecTV Dyad 
 
Year Event Tension and actions  
1999 TiVo strikes mass-distribution deal with 
DirecTV 
Beginning of collaboration between TiVo and DirecTV. 
Potential increase in dyadic and multilateral tensions with 
other content distributors (e.g., cable provider, DISH). 
 
2000 DirecTV set top box with integrated TiVo 
service introduced in the market. 
Mitigates dyadic tension. 
 
2000 TiVo and Comcast deploy TiVo stand-
alone DVRs and service to Comcast 
subscribers in NJ. 
 
Increases dyadic tension in TiVo-DirecTV relationship due 
to initiative with DirecTV competitor (Comcast). 
 
2001 DirecTV collaborates with Microsoft to 
launch Microsoft's Ultimate TV service. 
 
Increases dyadic tension with TiVo; also lead to multilateral 
spillover in tensions. 
 
2001 TiVo strikes a distribution agreement with 
AT&T Broadband.  
Increases dyadic tension with DirecTV; multilateral 
spillover 
2001 Agreement with DirecTV strengthened to 
include development and distribution. 
 
Mitigates dyadic tension between TiVo and DirecTV. 
 
2002 Comcast merges with AT&T Broadband; 
thereby stopping TiVo's trials with 
AT&T.  
 
Mitigates dyadic tension with DirecTV; multilateral 
spillover. 
 
2004 News Corp gains control of DirecTV; 
DirecTV to use in-house DVR technology 
and not TiVo’s. 
Increases dyadic tension with DirecTV; Potential for 
multilateral tension with NewsCorp., content provider and 
DirecTV's new parent. 
2005 Comcast to distribute TiVo-integrated 
DVRs to its cable subscribers, and jointly 
develop interactive advertising platform. 
 
Increases dyadic tension with DirecTV; multilateral 
spillover 
 
2006 DirecTV and TiVo extend partnership to 
2010. DirecTV will stop selling TiVo 
enabled boxes or service after Feb 2007. 
But, TiVo will continue to serve existing 
DirecTV subscribers. 
  
Increases dyadic tension due to DirecTV's actions not to 
offer TiVo boxes or service. 
 
2006 News Corp. swaps controlling interest in 
DirecTV for Liberty Media's stake in 
News Corp. 
Decreases dyadic tension with TiVo. 
2007 DirecTV buys most Replay TV related 
assets from D&M holdings 
Increases dyadic tension with TiVo due to DirecTV's 
actions in buying competing DVR technology. 
2008 DirecTV offers a new HD DirecTV DVR 
with TiVo service. But, DirecTV also is 
free to offer its own DVR services. 
 
Increases dyadic tension due to DirecTV's actions in 
offering competing DVR. 
2012 TiVo's HD DVR for DirecTV available 
nationwide. 
 
Mitigates dyadic tension between TiVo and DirecTV. 
 
Note: This is an abridged chronology of events pertaining just to one dyad, and offered for illustrative purposes.  
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Figure 1: A Process Model of Dynamics that Unfold During the Introduction of a Disruptive Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Circles in the figure represent the actions of the firm that introduces the disruptive innovation, whereas squares represent ecosystem dynamics. 
